Santa Clara Journal of International Law
Volume 12
Issue 1 Symposium on the Law and Politics of Foreign
Investment

Article 12

1-17-2014

Dispute Settlement Clauses in Investor-State
Arbitration: An Informed Approach to Empirical
Studies About Law A Reponse to Professor Yackee
Catherine M. Amirfar

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/scujil
Recommended Citation
Catherine M. Amirfar, Dispute Settlement Clauses in Investor-State Arbitration: An Informed Approach to Empirical Studies About Law A
Reponse to Professor Yackee, 12 Santa Clara J. Int'l L. 303 (2014).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/scujil/vol12/iss1/12

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Santa
Clara Journal of International Law by an authorized editor of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com, pamjadi@scu.edu.

Dispute Settlement Clauses in Investor-State Arbitration

Dispute Settlement
Clauses in InvestorState Arbitration:
An Informed Approach
to Empirical Studies
About Law
A Response to Professor
Yackee
Catherine M. Amirfar

303

12 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 303 (2013)

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

Introduction.........................................................................305

II.

Preliminary Observations ................................................305

III. Critiques of Professor Yackee’s Model ..........................307
IV.

304

Revised Model and Conclusions ......................................312

Dispute Settlement Clauses in Investor-State Arbitration

I. Introduction
Professor Yackee’s paper, “Do States Bargain over Investor-State Dispute Settlement?
Or, Toward Greater Collaboration in the Study of Bilateral Investment Treaties,” offers a
useful reminder to social scientists and lawyers alike that each can benefit from the other
in order to generate more reliable empirical studies in the legal field. On that point,
Professor Yackee and I agree. We also agree on several points that flow from that basic
premise, namely that the law can benefit from empirical research; that reliable empirical
research requires sound methodologies that social scientists are best suited to provide;
and that empirical studies assessing legal issues must be based on accurate underlying
assumptions that lawyers are best suited to provide.
Professor Yackee and I diverge, however, when it comes to the methodology and
underlying assumptions he employs in the example he has chosen to demonstrate that
sound empirical research requires an interdisciplinary approach. In his paper, he
critiques a 2010 article by social scientists Todd Allee and Clint Peinhardt, entitled
“Delegating Differences: Bilateral Investment Treaties and Bargaining over Dispute
Resolution Provisions.” Specifically, Professor Yackee challenges the underlying
assumptions and the corresponding values assigned by Professors Allee and Peinhardt in
coding the “strength” of investor-state dispute settlement (“ISDS”) clauses in bilateral
investment treaties (“BITs”) to test their theory that the variance in ISDS clauses can be
explained by the relative bargaining power of States. Professor Yackee offers an
alternative ranking of the strength of ISDS clauses in order to demonstrate the value of
collaboration between social scientists and lawyers.
In this response, I offer different views on the role of empirical research in the law, the
value of collaboration, and the relative strength of ISDS clauses providing for resolution
of disputes in different arbitral fora, based on my experience as a practitioner regularly
using empirical data and frequently grappling with the themes underlying Allee and
Peinhardt’s study. Part II of my response makes two preliminary observations that I
believe should inform the approach to interdisciplinary collaboration in the development
of empirical studies about law. Part III discusses specific critiques of Professor Yackee’s
model, and suggests alternate values for coding the strength of ISDS clauses in BITs. In
Part IV, I use Professor Yackee’s data to run a regression model using my alternate
coding system. As will be discussed, my results vary markedly from Professor Yackee’s
and suggest some conclusions about both the methodologies employed in empirical
research and the important role lawyers can play in that research.

II. Preliminary Observations
As Professor Yackee notes, a primary line of empirical research on BITs considers
treaties as dependent variables and attempts to explain why States sign BITs or why
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they sign BITs with particular provisions.1 The answers to these questions can provide
critical guidance to arbitral tribunals interpreting those provisions and to counsel
arguing in favor of a particular interpretation. Thus, as an initial matter, I agree with
Professor Yackee’s first basic premise: Empirical research has an important place in legal
scholarship, and, in particular, in the study of international investment arbitration.
Professor Yackee’s second basic premise is equally non-controversial: At present,
empirical legal studies are not sufficiently robust and can be much improved through
greater interdisciplinary collaboration between lawyers and social scientists. On the one
hand, the legal academy and profession are not well equipped to produce, and in some
instances are not producing, reliable empirical results. Far too many examples exist of
the “fluid” use of statistics by lawyers, and, as a profession, we must become more selfcritical of our shortcomings in this area and strive to import methods that social
scientists consider reliable (defined as being replicable and consistent) and valid (defined
as being free from bias). At the same time, studies on law and legal phenomena that are
produced by social scientists, such as the study by Professors Allee and Peinhardt, can
suffer from the authors’ lack of legal training and fundamental misunderstandings as to
how the law works and is perceived by those who practice it. As Professor Yackee rightly
observes, it is unrealistic to expect either camp to become expert in the other’s
methodologies.
But the idea that both sides can benefit from collaboration—that is, that lawyers have
something to add to empirical research on law—should not be surprising. The question,
then, is how to operationalize the collaboration, how best to draw on lawyers’ expertise
and implement it into empirical studies on law. In this regard, two preliminary
observations should be made.
The first observation is that the search for expertise should not be limited to the legal
academy. Rather, it should encompass practitioners as well. This is not only for the
obvious reason that practitioners may be experts in a relevant area of law, but also
because there is a perhaps “hidden” repository of statistical expertise among those who
practice law. As counsel in complex international commercial and investment disputes,
practitioners are frequently required to cross-examine scientific and technical experts
who are highly trained in the methodologies employed by Professors Yackee, Allee, and
Peinhardt. In order to conduct effective cross-examination, practicing lawyers must
develop fluency in the vocabulary of statistics to become as familiar and comfortable with
the terminology and the underlying concepts as are the expert witnesses being examined.
This familiarity and comfort with statistical tools and concepts makes practicing lawyers
well-positioned to contribute to empirical legal studies in meaningful ways.
1.
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My second observation is a methodological one. As we seek to improve the quality of
empirical studies of law and law-related phenomena via interdisciplinary collaboration,
we must emphasize the use of sound empirical methods. As Professor Yackee
acknowledges, although he suggests a “reconstruction” of Allee and Peinhardt’s
dependent variable—an alternative coding of ISDS clause strength—he does not perform
a “replication” of their original study.2 That is, he did not apply his reconstructed
dependent variable to Allee and Peinhardt’s original data. Thus, his approach does not
present or permit a true comparison between a study of BIT provisions uninformed by
legal expertise, and the same study informed by such expertise.
While Professor Yackee’s transparency is commendable, for those seeking to draw
reliable conclusions from such empirical studies, this approach can be deeply
unsatisfactory. In short, Professor Yackee’s analysis is inherently limited by the lack of
“replication.” If lawyers are to conduct empirical studies that produce reliable and useful
results, we must embrace the proven methodologies of the scientific disciplines, such as
data-sharing, replication, and peer review.

III.Critiques of Professor Yackee’s Model
While I agree with many of Professor Yackee’s observations and critiques of Allee and
Peinhardt’s model, Professor Yackee’s own model in some respects suffers from what I
view to be a flawed ranking of the strength of ISDS clauses.
Professor Yackee’s model assigns the greatest value (2) to ISDS clauses providing a
choice between ICSID and non-ICSID options, the second greatest value (1) to ICSIDonly clauses, and the lowest value (0) to ISDS clauses designating only non-ICSID fora.
He excludes both BITs that contain no ISDS clause, and BITs that contain ISDS clauses
covering only certain types of disputes. This latter category includes, for example, the
early BITs of China and of the former Soviet Union, which limit arbitrable disputes to
those involving “compensation for expropriation.”3
Professor Yackee’s primary critique of Allee and Peinhardt’s model is that they rank
ICSID-only dispute resolution clauses above dispute resolution clauses containing a
choice of either ICSID or other fora. On this basis, Professor Yackee inverts Allee and
Peinhardt’s ranking of a 2 for ICSID-only clauses and a 1 for clauses with a choice of
ICSID or non-ICSID fora. I agree with Professor Yackee’s assumption that there is some
value in choice and that “context matters.”4 In this vein, assigning a higher value to an
ISDS clause with a choice of fora than to an ICSID-only clause seems logical. In the

2.
3.
4.

Id. at 292, 294.
See, e.g., Agreement between the Government of New Zealand and the Government of the
People’s Republic of China on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, China-N.Z., Nov. 22,
1988, 1787 U.N.T.S. 186.
Yackee, supra note 1, at 288.
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coding I propose, as in Professor Yackee’s model, an ISDS clause providing a choice
between ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration is assigned a 2.
My first point of departure from Professor Yackee’s model concerns his assignment of
a value of 1 to ICSID-only clauses and 0 to clauses designating only non-ICSID fora.
Professor Yackee surveys the relative merits of ICSID versus non-ICSID arbitration, and
concludes that it is only “arguable” that an ICSID-only clause is better than a clause that
provides only non-ISCID options because “the case that ICSID is necessarily and
significantly better than the leading alternatives is not so clear.”5 Yet his reconstruction
continues to privilege ICSID-only ISDS clauses over clauses that provide exclusively for
non-ICSID arbitration. This ranking relies on the same flawed and statistically
unsupported assumptions that Professor Yackee himself challenges—that ICSID is
better for investors than non-ICSID arbitration and that investors prefer ICSID to nonICSID options.
Even accepting the limited data available, we can and should still make informed
observations about the preference that investors or home States accord to ICSID versus
non-ICSID arbitration. First, based on the available numbers alone, it is not clear that
ICSID actually is the preferred forum. The United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (“UNCTAD”) reports that as of the end of 2011, a total of 279 investment
arbitrations were brought under the ICSID Rules or ICSID Additional Facility Rules,
while 126 were initiated under the UNCITRAL Rules, 21 under the Stockholm Chamber
of Commerce (“SCC”) Rules, seven under the International Chamber of Commerce
(“ICC”) Rules, one under the London Court of International Arbitration (“LCIA”) Rules,
and one under the rules of the Cairo Regional Centre for International Commercial
Arbitration.6 Of the 279 cases brought under the ICSID Rules or Additional Facility
Rules, approximately 10 percent fell into the latter category.7 Realistically, Additional
Facility cases should be treated separately because these involve non-signatories to the
ICSID Convention and are subject to enforcement under the New York Convention
rather than the ICSID framework. They are thus far more like UNCITRAL or other nonICSID cases than cases brought under the ICSID Convention. Adding the approximately
30 Additional Facility cases to the 156 cases administered outside the ICSID framework,
we begin to see that non-ICSID Convention investor-state arbitrations are far more
prevalent than might be imagined.

5.
6.
7.
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Id. at 292.
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, April 2012, Latest Developments in
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Second, ICSID awards are still subject to challenge. Conceptually, the ICSID scheme
is arguably superior; the ICSID Convention requires that Contracting States enforce a
pecuniary award rendered under the Convention “as if it were a final judgment of a court
in that State,”8 and therefore should not be subject to national court review as is the case
for New York Convention awards.9 But there are problems with assuming that this
straightforward scheme leads to higher compliance. As an initial matter, ICSID does
contemplate potential annulment of the award by an annulment committee. While
annulment is supposed to be restricted to narrow grounds, there have been some highprofile instances of committees annulling awards arguably outside the scope of their
limited mandate.10 Also, ICSID awards, like other international arbitral awards, are
subject to challenge in national courts on the same bases available under domestic law to
challenge any final judgment. In the United States, for example, Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b) provides for challenge of a final judgment on the bases of, inter alia,
mistakes, newly discovered evidence, fraud by an opposing party, lack of impartiality of

8.

9.

10.

Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other
States
Regulations
and
Rules
art.
54(1),
Mar.
18,
1965,
available
at
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/CRR_English-final.pdf (reprinted in
Apr. 2006) [hereinafter ICSID Convention] (providing in full “[e]ach Contracting State shall
recognize an award rendered pursuant to this Convention as binding and enforce the
pecuniary obligations imposed by that award within its territories as if it were a final
judgment of a court in that State. A Contracting State with a federal constitution may
enforce such an award in or through its federal courts and may provide that such courts shall
treat the award as if it were a final judgment of the courts of a constituent state.”).
See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, art. V, June 10,
1958, 25 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention]. National courts may
refuse to recognize and enforce an award under the New York Convention on seven grounds.
These grounds are interpreted narrowly in many, if not most, jurisdictions. See, e.g., Sylvia
Tonova, Compliance and Enforcement of Awards: Is There a Practical Difference between ICSID
and Non-ICSID Awards?, in 5 INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 229,
246 (Ian A. Laird and Todd J. Weiler eds., 2012).
See, e.g., Lucy F. Reed and Giorgio Francesco Mandelli, Ad hoc or ad arbitrum? An Audit of
Recent ICSID Annulment Decisions, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
AND MEDIATION: THE FORDHAM PAPERS 2011, 70 (Arthur W. Rovine ed., 2012) (discussing the
controversial annulment decisions in Helnan Int’l Hotels A/S v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID
Case No. ARB/05/19 (annulment proceeding), Decision of the ad hoc Committee (June 14, 2010);
Sempra Energy Int’l v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16 (annulment proceeding),
Decision
on
Application
for
Annulment
(June
29,
2010),
available
at
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&doc
Id=DC1550_En&caseId=C8; Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case
No. ARB/01/3 (annulment proceeding), Decision on Application for Annulment (July 30, 2010),
available at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0299.pdf; Compañia de
Aguas del Aconquija S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3 (annulment
proceeding), Decision on Application for Annulment (Aug. 10, 2010), available at
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0221.pdf); Christoph Schreuer, From
ICSID Annulment to Appeal: Halfway Down the Slippery Slope, in 10 THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 211 (2011); and Promod Nair and Claudia Ludwig,
ICSID Annulment Awards: The Fourth Generation?, 5 GLOBAL ARB. REV., Issue 5, Oct. 28, 2010.
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the decision-maker, and unequal knowledge and bargaining power.11 Similar grounds for
challenge exist in the laws of Belgium, Chile, Colombia, France, Switzerland, and
Venezuela.12 While it is important not to overstate the implications of this point, since
such challenges do not appear to be a serious issue in current practice, the prospect of
challenge on these bases remain. 13
Third, there is as yet little empirical proof that the ICSID enforcement regime leads to
higher rates of compliance than the New York Convention regime.14 Generally speaking,
most States voluntarily comply with investment arbitration awards against them. A 2008
study, for example, found that 81 percent of participating corporations did not enforce or
seek to enforce arbitral awards against States, namely because of high rates of voluntary
compliance and the negotiation of post-award settlements.15 The States that do resist
compliance with awards have done so regardless of the arbitral fora. Argentina, for
example, continues to resist enforcement of ICSID and non-ICSID awards alike.16 The
bottom line appears to be that States that want access to international markets and
capital will comply with adverse arbitration awards, regardless of the arbitral institution
or rules by which the award was rendered.
Fourth, there are a number of practical concerns that may counsel in favor of nonICSID arbitration options for a particular client or dispute. The cost and time of ICSID
arbitrations are a significant factor weighing in favor of less costly alternatives.17 The

11.

12.

13.
14.
15.
16.

17.
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FED R. CIV. P. 60(b); see also Freya Baetens, Enforcement of Arbitral Awards: “To ICSID or Not to
ICSID” is Not the Question, in 5 INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 211,
219-20 (Ian A. Laird and Todd J. Weiler, eds. 2012); Edward Baldwin, Mark Kantor, and Michael
Nolan, Limits to Enforcement of ICSID Awards, 23(1) J. INT’L ARB. 1, 9-11 (2006).
See Baetens, supra note 10, at 220 (citing CODE DE PROCÉDURE CIVILE [C.P.C.][CODE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE] art. 1480 (Fr.); CODE DE PROCÉDURE CIVILE [C.P.C.][CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE] art.
1704 (Belg.); BUNDESGESETZ ÜBER DAS INTERNATIONAL PRIVATRECHT [IPRG][FED. ACT ON
PRIVATE INT’L LAW] Dec. 18, 1987, SR 291, art. 190(2) (Switz.); CÓDIGO DE PROCEDIMENTO CIVIL
[C.P.C.][CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE] art. 244 (Venez.)); Baldwin et al., supra note 10, at 14
(discussing CÓDIGO DE PROCEDIMENTO CIVIL [C.P.C.][CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE] arts. 365, 379
(Colom.) and CÓDIGO DE PROCEDIMENTO CIVIL [CÓD. PROC. CIV.][CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE] art. 810
(Chile)).
See. e.g., Tonova, supra note 8, at 239–40.
See Baetens, supra note 10, at 211, 227 (remarking that the “admittedly limited” jurisprudence
indicates that ICSID and non-ICSID awards are challenged in domestic courts at similar rates).
Crina Baltag, Special Section on the 2008 Survey on Corporate Attitudes Towards Recognition and
Enforcement of International Arbitration Awards: Enforcement of Awards Against States, 19 AM.
REV. INT’L ARB. 391, 403–08 (2008).
See, e.g., Luke Eric Peterson, Argentina by the Numbers: Where Things Stand with Investment
Treaty Claims Arising Out of the Argentine Financial Crisis, INVESTMENT ARBITRATION REPORTER
(Feb. 1, 2011), http://www.iareporter.com/articles/20110201_9 (discussing unpaid and challenged
arbitration awards against Argentina in both the ICSID and UNCITRAL systems).
See LUCY REED, JAN PAULSSON, AND NIGEL BLACKABY, GUIDE TO ICSID ARBIRATION 154–55
(2011) (although ICSID administrative and arbitrator costs are relatively low compared to other
international arbitration regimes, parties’ legal costs are “typically high,” due to the frequent
separation of the jurisdictional phase, the complexity of the legal and factual issues in
international investment law, the number and length of written pleadings, and the use of fact
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availability of interim relief from national courts in non-ICSID arbitrations is another
important reason that non-ICSID arbitration is sometimes preferable.18 Jurisdictional
thresholds also factor into advice to clients. The ICSID framework arguably has more
stringent jurisdictional thresholds, requiring an “investment” to fall within the scope of
both the definition of “investment” in the relevant contract or treaty and the
interpretation of an “investment” under the ICSID Convention.19 Finally, considerations
relating to confidentiality can also favor non-ICSID options. While ICSID can require the
Secretariat to publish excerpts of a tribunal’s legal reasoning and the names of the
parties,20 some rules, such as the ICC Rules, contain no transparency requirements. An
investor that does not want public disclosure of a dispute might favor non-ICSID
arbitration. This factor may become irrelevant, however, as other arbitral institutions,
including UNCITRAL, adopt transparency requirements.21
All of these considerations serve to challenge the notion that ICSID is necessarily
superior to non-ICSID arbitration options, which Professor Yackee’s model continues to
suggest. Moreover, we should not lose sight of the fact that access to international
arbitration—the adjudication of a dispute by a neutral, international body—is of
immense value to investors regardless of the forum. In view of the lack of empirical
evidence suggesting otherwise and the inherent value of access to international
arbitration, I would accordingly rank ICSID-only ISDS clauses on an equal level with
those clauses designating only a non-ICSID option. In the model I propose, both types of
clauses are assigned a value of 1.
My final, and from the methodological perspective, most important critique of
Professor Yackee’s model relates to the exclusion from his analysis of BITs with no ISDS
clauses at all and BITs with ISDS clauses that limit the arbitral tribunal’s subject matter
jurisdiction, such as the “compensation only” clauses mentioned above.22 I disagree that

18.
19.
20.

21.
22.

witnesses and experts at hearings); Anthony Sinclair, ICSID Arbitration: How Long Does it Take?,
4 GLOBAL ARB. REV., no. 5, 2009 (reporting that the average length of an ICSID arbitration is 3.6
years, from the filing of the request for arbitration to the date of the final award, but that this
timeline is shortening; the average timeline for the 32 cases commenced the five years preceding
the study was closer to 3.2 years)
See Gaëtan Verhoosel, Annulment and Enforcement Review of Treaty Awards: To ICSID or Not to
ICSID, in 50 YEARS OF THE NEW YORK CONVENTION 285, 316 (Albert Jan van den Berg, ed. 2009).
See, e.g., Joy Mining v. Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/11, Award on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 43, 48 (6
August 2004), 13 ICSID Rep. 121 (2009) (applying the “double barrel” test).
See ICSID Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceeding Rule 48(4) (April 2006),
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/CRR_English-final.pdf;
ICSID
Administrative
and
Financial
Regulations
Regulation
22
(April
2006),
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/CRR_English-final.pdf.
See UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration (adopted by
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on 11 July 2013) (providing for
public hearings, publication of case information and pleadings, and submissions by third parties).
Yackee, supra note 1, at 294.
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these two categories of BITs are “conceptually irrelevant,”23 at least as to studies
assessing the strength of ISDS clauses in investment treaties. ISDS clauses that limit
the arbitration tribunal’s subject matter jurisdiction are inherently weaker than clauses
that include a “full delegation” as to subject matter.24 BITs that include no provision for
the settlement of disputes between investors and states are weaker still. I would assign
both of these categories a value of 0 rather than exclude them from the analysis. It is
important to note that excluding these categories of BITs restricts the inferences made to
within the scope of the remaining treaties included; thus potentially valuable information
is discarded. Moreover, the causal relationships between independent variables and
treaty type may differ at the “lower” end of weaker treaty types.

IV. Revised Model and Conclusions
Going back to the purpose of the underlying analysis, this empirical research on BITs
considers treaties as dependent variables and attempts to explain why States sign BITs
or why they sign BITs with particular provisions. As described above, for purposes of my
regression model, I use the following coding:
I agree with Professor Yackee that an ISDS clause providing a choice between
ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration should be assigned the highest value of 2;
I disagree with Professor Yackee’s assignment of a value of 1 to ICSID-only
clauses and 0 to clauses designating only non-ICSID fora. Instead, I rank an ISDS
providing for international arbitration, whether ICSID-only or a non-ICSID option,
equally, and assign a value of 1; and
I disagree with Professor Yackee’s exclusion of BITs with no ISDS clauses at all
and BITs with ISDS clauses that limit the arbitral tribunal’s subject matter
jurisdiction. I instead assign those categories a value of 0.
I should note that I only changed the coding of the dependent variable. I did not
attempt alternative model specifications using different independent variables, nor did I
perform any model diagnostics, as making valid inferences based on this analysis was not
my goal. Rather, my intent simply was to explore the extent to which estimated
coefficients from Professor Yackee’s model were subject to change based on the values
assigned to treaty type.
By making just these two changes to the dependent variable, the model produced
quantitatively and qualitatively different results. Figure 1 below displays estimated
coefficients from both models along with their 90% confidence interval, ordered by the
magnitude of Professor Yackee’s estimates.25

23.
24.
25.
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Id. at 285-86.
I followed Professor Yackee’s choice of an alpha level of 0.10. For purposes of display, the following
independent variables were re-scaled: polity durability is per decade, host GDP growth rate is per
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0.2
0.1

Estimated coefficient

0
-0.1
-0.2
-0.3

Yackee model
Amirfar model

-0.4
-0.5
-0.6
-0.7

In particular, the host colony and host IBRD dummy variables, which had exhibited
statistically significant negative associations with treaty strength in Professor Yackee’s
model, were substantially attenuated in my model and lost statistical significance. The
FDI outflow variable similarly was attenuated and lost statistical significance in my
model. Conversely, the “ICSID signed” dummy variable and host GDP growth rate had
been statistically insignificant in Professor Yackee’s model, but each exhibited a stronger
(and statistically significant) negative relationship with treaty strength in my model. The
estimated associations (or lack thereof) with host polity durability, GDP difference, polity
rating, and calendar year were qualitatively similar in our two models.
To illustrate the differences in conclusions that might be drawn between the two
models, consider host GDP growth: the negative association between a State’s preference
for strong dispute resolution clauses and the host State’s GDP growth is consistent with
the theory of Professors Allee and Peinhard that the variance in ISDS clauses can be
explained by the relative bargaining power of States, and in particular, that highperforming States prefer, and negotiate for, weak dispute resolution clauses. But this is
the precise opposite of Professor Yackee’s results, which indicate a positive association,

10 percent, and GDP difference is per $100 billion.
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suggesting that better-performing host States are more likely to accept strong ISDS
clauses. The other differences in model estimates described above lead to similar
divergences in interpretation.
All told, Professor Yackee’s model does not demonstrate that there is in fact “apparent
tension with Allee and Peinhardt’s theory Here, the limitations of an analysis that
merely “reconstructs,” (i.e., applying the re-coding to a “reconstructed” data set) rather
than “replicates” (i.e., apply the re-coding to Allee and Peinhardt’s original data) become
stark, since this approach cannot present or permit a true comparison between these
studies of BIT provisions.
However, the regression model I ran with my re-coding and changed inputs is based
on Professor Yackee’s data, so that model does in fact “replicate” his analysis to permit a
comparison between the results of his and my models. That comparison indicates that
the changes in the dependent variable did in fact result in divergences in interpretation.
That means, in turn, that the judgment used to “code” the strength of ISDS clauses is
demonstrably important. This supports Professor Yackee’s basic premise that such
decisions are better left to legal professionals who are experts in the field, and that social
scientists can benefit from collaborating with such professionals when devising empirical
research studies.
As I have seen in my practice, sound empirical work has tremendous potential to
inform legal analysis and drive policy. Before it can do so, however, a more systematic
and scientific approach must be taken toward the incorporation of legal expertise into
empirical research.
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Appendix 1: Model Comparison Results
PROFESSOR
MODEL

YACKEE

depvar_best

Coef.

Std. Err.

z

P>|z|

[95%
Conf.

Interval]

------------

------------

--------------

------

--------

--------------

----------

home_fdi_o~s

-0.04287

0.021714

-1.97

0.048

host_colony

-0.36788

0.19695

-1.87

0.062

-0.75389

0.018139

host_polity2

0.0333

0.00502

6.63

0

0.023461

0.043139

host_polit~y

0.000752

0.003394

0.22

0.825

-0.0059

0.007404

host_gdp_g~h

-0.00888

0.007548

-1.18

0.239

-0.02367

0.005913

-0.08543

-0.00032

host_ibrd_~s

-0.23973

0.138953

-1.73

0.084

-0.51207

0.032612

icsid_signed

-0.09169

0.137213

-0.67

0.504

-0.36062

0.177242

diff_gdp

7.63E-14

7.24E-14

1.05

0.292

-6.56E-14

2.18E-13

year_counter

0.063601

0.021592

2.95

0.003

0.021282

0.105919

AMIRFAR MODEL
cma_nomissing

Coef.

Std. Err.

z

P>|z|

[95%
Conf.

Interval]

------------

------------

--------------

------

--------

--------------

----------

home_fdi_o~s

-0.02453

0.02585

-0.95

0.343

-0.0752

0.026135

host_colony

-0.04763

0.117065

-0.41

0.684

-0.27707

0.181813

host_polity2

0.02702

0.006582

4.11

0

0.01412

0.039919

host_polit~y

0.001268

0.003271

0.39

0.698

-0.00514

0.007679

host_gdp_g~h

-0.02442

0.005546

-4.4

0

-0.03529

-0.01355

host_ibrd_~s

-0.00777

0.099534

-0.08

0.938

-0.20286

0.187311

icsid_signed

-0.20448

0.11972

-1.71

0.088

-0.43913

0.030163

diff_gdp

9.22E-14

1.02E-13

0.9

0.365

-1.07E-13

2.92E-13

0.10074

0.021975

4.58

0

0.05767

0.14381

year_counter
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